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Like most developing countries, Brazil is in pursuit of a pension reform able to guarantee 
old-age protection to its citizens without overburdening the fiscal budget. The past decade 
has seen some progress, most of which occurred as a result of the 1998 Constitutional 
Amendment nº 20.  
 
When one thinks of pension reform it is natural to look to a system that covers the greatest 
portion of the population and thus is fundamental to the welfare of the low-income 
segment. In the Brazilian case, however, if one focuses on how the current deficits of 
different pension systems affect the countrys fiscal condition, priority will be given to the 
systems covering public employees. In many developing countries public-sector workers 
constitute one of the most well organized groups in society and are politically well 
equipped to defend their rights. The pension system that covers these employees tends 
therefore to be more generous than the one covering private-sector workers. In fact, it may 
be argued that lower wages in the public sector are compensated by the generosity of the 
pension system (De Jong and Turner, 1998).  
 
Even in other Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Mexico, that implemented 
wider pension reforms, these reforms did little to correct the problems of public-employee 
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pension systems (Raimundi and Mariano, 1996; Rofman, 2000). The Federal Government 
in Argentina concluded in 1993 treaty with the Provinces that included the absorption of 
many State pension funds (Cajas Provinciales) that were running significant deficits with 
huge fiscal consequences to the Federal Government. In Mexico the reforms implemented 
also left the public-employee pension system unaltered (Sales-Sarrapy et al. 1999). 
 
This paper discusses in its first section the origins of the pension system covering public 
employees in Brazil at all three governmental levels (Federal, State, and municipal) and its 
current actuarial and financial condition. This section also compares the coverage and 
financial needs of this system with the one directed at the private sector. The second section 
of this paper discusses the effects of the 1998 Constitutional Amendment nº 20 on the 
operation of public-employee pension plans. In the third section the paper discusses the 
reform of the Federal employee retirement system in the U.S. The paper argues that this 
reform experience may provide interesting insights for the reform of public-sector pensions 
in Brazil and other developing countries. 
 
The fourth section deals with the reform experiences of four Brazilian States. Emphasis is 
given to the efforts made by these States to introduce some degree of pre-funding into their 
pension systems, to set more adequate contribution rates and to create an efficient 
management structure. Finally, World Bank recommendations and the authors proposal for 
reform of the Brazilian public-employee pension system are treated in the fifth section.  
 
Besides discussing the conditions for the actuarial equilibrium of public-employee pension 
systems in Brazil, this paper raises the deeper question of whether there is an efficiency 
justification for making separate retirement provisions for public-sector workers and 
private-sector workers. If one thinks of the beneficial effects of a greater risk pool and 
lower administration costs, there might well be solid ground for integrating these two 




History of the Public-Employee Pension System 
 
In order to grasp the current situation of the Brazilian pension system, it is first necessary to 
understand the components of this system. The public pillar, which is defined-benefit and 
pay-as-you-go, may be divided into two systems: (a) the general system (RGPS), which is 
intended to function as a universal system covering the whole population of individuals 
engaged in private-sector activities (employees and self-employed), and (b) the system 
covering public-sector employees. Although some uniform rules regulate system (b)  such 
as benefit formulas and requirements for retirement  in fact, all States and around 2,000 
municipalities manage their own systems, setting the contribution rates. The Federal 
Government also has a separate system for its employees. The private sector funded pillar 
is still quite underdeveloped in Brazil. Occupational pension plans  defined-benefit and 
defined-contribution  cover less then 8% of the workforce formally employed in the 
private sector (Rabelo, 2000b). Personal pension plans have experienced rapid growth since 
1995, but their rate of coverage is still limited, even though no precise data on this matter 
exists. 
 
Employment relations in the private sector have been governed since the late thirties by the 
Consolidated Labor Legislation (CLT) enacted during the Vargas dictatorship. Before the 
1988 Constitution, employment in the public sector was usually regulated by a set of 
statutory standards specific to each public entity, even though the public sector was also 
allowed to hire employees under CLT. As a general rule, these statutory standards tended to 
provide greater employment stability and more generous retirement benefits than CLT.  
 
In the seventies, a decade of high economic growth and urban expansion in Brazil, the state 
apparatus had to hire more personnel in order to attend the increased demand for services. 
To facilitate this personnel expansion, government at all levels (Federal, State, and 
municipal) increased the number of civil servants hired under CLT, since hiring employees 
under the statutory regime was a much more complicated and longer process. In fact, before 
1988, around 75% of Federal Government employees were already working under CLT. 
This type of employment relationship meant that state bodies had to contribute as an 
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employer to the general social security system (RGPS) and also to an employment time 
guarantee fund (FGTS)3. Most States and municipalities, however, did not pay their 
employer contributions to the National Institute of Social Security (INSS)  the agency 
responsible for the management of RGPS  as this agency lacked effective enforcement 
instruments. 
 
An important landmark was the 1988 Constitution, which created a set of unified rules for 
employment in the public sector. Prior to this, statutory rules governing public employment 
varied widely among public entities. The law also established unified rules governing the 
social security benefits of public employees and reaffirmed employment stability in the 
public sector.  
 
At the same time a powerful measure to deal with government bodies in debt to the INSS 
was introduced. A new law authorized the Federal Government to withhold transferences 
from State and Municipal Participation Funds to those who had not settled their debts with 
the INSS. Since transfers from these funds were important sources of revenues for many 
States and municipalities, mayors and Governors could no longer simply ignore paying 
their employer contributions  a 20% contribution rate of the total wage bill  to the INSS. 
As a result States and municipalities accumulate presently a very expressive debt to INSS 
and became eager to move to a different type of employment contract. 
 
The new Constitution opened up the possibility of creating separate pension systems for 
public employees, without mentioning any requirement in terms of financial and actuarial 
equilibrium. This was a clear stimulus for public bodies to revert to the statutory regime 
(now with unified rules) as the preferential employment contract. All levels of public 
employees hired under CLT were transferred en masse to these separate pension regimes. 
The equation was indeed a very perverse one: separate pension regimes, characterized by 
an extremely generous benefit formula and low contribution rates, were created, passing on 
the financing burden to future generations. 
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The Constitution determined that the benefit formula of all public-employee pension plans 
must contain two provisions: (a) the guarantee of a retirement benefit (and an ensuing 
survivor pension) equal to the last wage received by the employee when in activity, and (b) 
the automatic transfer to retirement benefits and survivor pension of any salary increase 
granted to active workers (whether due to a productivity raise or job reclassification). The 
Constitution, however, did not establish a minimum retirement age: the only requirement 
was at least 30 years of service, but not necessarily 30 years of specific contributions to the 
Federal, State, or municipal pension system that would pay the retirement benefit. In 
theory, the employee may have contributed 29 years to the RGPS (11% up to the RGPS 
ceiling), yet receive a benefit from a public-sector pension system with only one year of 
contribution. Also, Federal legislation failed to insist on the actuarial and financial 
equilibrium of public-sector pension plans. States and municipalities were in fact legally 
allowed to create pension plans for their employees with practically as many benefits as 
desired and to set a contribution rate insufficient to maintain the system in equilibrium. 
Usually the State or municipal law that created the pension plans only established a 
contribution destined to finance survivor pensions and/or health care. Though employee 
contributions were effectively transferred to the entity managing survivors benefits, 
employers contributions were frequently forgotten. Federal, State, or municipal treasuries 
then solely financed retirement benefits. 
 
It is no surprise then that public-employee pension systems are at present operating with 
very high deficits. Table 1 shows the financial situation of the general system (RGPS) and 
that of public-employee systems at all three government levels. The measured deficit 
represents current government spending to finance pension benefits. The deficit with 
imputed government contribution considers an employer contribution equivalent to two 
times that of the employees4, and even in this case the system presents a significant deficit. 
Government transfers to finance the public-employee pension system were then over four 
times higher then transfers to cover the deficit of the RGPS. In 2000, the financing needs of 
the consolidated public-employee pension systems reached 4.1% of Brazils GDP. These 
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numbers are even more impressive when one compares the coverage of each of these 
systems (tables 2, 3 and 4). 
 
In 2000, the RGPS paid pension benefits to a population of approximately 19.5 million 
people. As shown in table 2, retirement and survivor benefits alone are being paid to circa 
16 million people5. The Federal and State public-employee pension systems totaled 3.4 
million beneficiaries and in 2000 paid benefits of R$48.8 billion, which equals 74% of all 
benefits paid by the RGPS. Clearly this is a perverse social-security arrangement that, in 
fact, transfers income from the lower income strata to a segment of the middle class. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 also show a very worrisome characteristic of the public-employee pension 
system: the low ratio of active workers to retirees and survivors with pensions. At the 
Federal level, retirees and survivors with pensions represent 49.3% of all personnel (1.02 
ratio). The situation in the States, particularly the most populous ones, is not much better. 
In the State of Rio Grande do Sul (RS), for example, the number of retirees and survivors 
with pensions is already superior to that of active employees. Since no pre-funding exists 
and employee contributions are low, the State and municipal treasuries have to answer for 
both the greater part of ongoing retirement benefits and the payroll of active employees. 
This has a perverse effect on the human-resource policies of the public sector. It becomes 
increasingly difficult for States and municipalities to hire new employee to replace those 
retired and to grant salary increases to active employees6. 
 
In April 2001, an actuarial evaluation of the Federal public-employee pension system was 
completed, based on data covering 96% of the universe of Federal civil servants in Brazil 
(Probus, 2001). A separate evaluation was done for the military pension system (Governo 
Federal, 2001). The average monthly retiree benefit for Federal civil servants was 
R$1,953.40 and the average survivor pension was R$1,497.48 (compare these to average 
                                                 
5 The rest are temporary benefits (sickness, incarceration, accident) and social assistance benefits. In 1999, 
retirement and survivor pensions represented 88% of the value of total benefits paid by the RGPS. 
6 It must be kept in mind that any increase given to active employees must also be granted to pension 
beneficiaries. 
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RGPS benefits in table 1). Graphs 1 and 2 show the actuarial projections for the deficit of 
these two systems. It must be said that the decline in the deficit of the civil servants pension 
system after the 2020s is due to two excessively optimistic hypothesis made by the 
Government (and highlighted by the actuary in his report): (a) a steep decrease in both the 
number of active employees and their respective beneficiaries7, and (b) the low parameter 
of exponential real-wage growth (1.5% a.a.). According to the actuary, in 2000 Federal 
Government spending on the pension system of its civil employees represented 1.12% of 
GDP, and this percentage is expected to grow to 1.14% in 2001. The costs of the pension 
system for military personnel represented an extra 0.79% of GDP in 2001 and are projected 
to grow to 0.81% in 2001. 
                                                 
7 The government will not replace employees that are in non-typical State careers. 
 8
Table 1  Estimates of Financing Needs of the Various Pension Regimes in Brazil 
  1997 1998 2000 












Values as % 
GDP 
Contributions 44.3  46.6  55.7  
Benefits 47.1  53.8  65.8  
Measured Deficit 2.8 0.32 7.2 0.79 10.1 0.90
II - PUBLIC SECTOR
PENSIONS            
Contributions 6.5  7.1  6.9  
Retiree and Survivors Pensions 38.2  40.4  52.0  
Measured Deficit 31.6 3.63 33.3 3.64 45.2 4.10
Deficit with imputed Government
Contribution* 18.7 2.15 19.1 2.09 31.4 2.90
Federal Public Pension System            
Contributions 2.6  2.8  2.7  
Retiree and Survivors Pensions 19.7  20.8  25.0  
Measured Deficit 17.1 1.96 18.0 1.97 22.2 2.00
Deficit with imputed Government
Contribution 11.9 1.37 12.4 1.36 16.8 1.50
State Public Pension Systems            
Contributions 3.6  3.9  3.7  
Retiree and Survivors Pensions 15.8  16.7  23.8  
Measured Deficit 12.2 1.40 12.8 1.40 20.1 1.80
Deficit with imputed Government
Contribution 5.0 0.57 5.0 0.55 12.8 1.20
Municipal Public Pension
Systems**            
Contributions 0.4  0.4  0.5  
Retiree and Survivors Pensions 2.7  2.9  3.3  
Measured Deficit 2.3 0.26 2.5 0.27 2.8 0.30
Deficit with imputed Government
Contribution 1.5 0.17 1.7 0.19 1.9 0.20
Source: SPS/MPAS 
* At the ratio of 2:1. 
** Data for 2000 are estimates. 
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Table 2 - A Picture of the General Regime (RGPS) in 1999 
 Number of Beneficiaries Average Benefit Value (R$) 
Retiree Pensions 11,094,956 286 
    Contribution Time 3,222,555 571 
    Age 5,658,406 162 
    Invalidity 2,213,995 188 
Survivor Pensions 4,953,949 207 
Total 16,048,905  
Source: Anuário Estatístico da Previdência Social (1999) 
 
Table 3  A Picture of the Federal Pension System for Civil Servants and Military 
Personnel in 2000 
Branch Current Active Retirees Survivors with 
Pensions 
Total 
Executive - Civil 536,321 394,877 209,090 1,140,288
Executive - Military 328,087 128,630 167,697 624,414
Legislative 19,458 7,424 3,485 30,367
Judiciary 80,932 15,417 5,288 101,637
Transfers 112,913 37,241 22,491 172,645
Total 1,942,119 1,107,096 784,838 3,834,053













+ Survivors)  
Expenses (Retirees + 
Survivors)/Total Personnel 
Expenses  
AL          32,202          11,886                 4,416                  1.98                            28.5  
AM          47,407          12,656                 3,685                  2.90                            23.8  
BA        155,140          48,720               16,218                  2.39                            22.4  
CE          88,667          22,151               10,360                  2.73                            22.2  
DF        118,952          30,358                 9,017                  3.02                            30.4  
ES            59,684          16,478                 5,721                  2.69                            31.6  
GO          75,029          26,816                 6,403                  2.26                            34.9  
MA          79,457          16,326                 6,687                  3.45                            30.6  
MG        250,000        160,000              26,000                  1.34                            43.7  
MS          39,906            9,351                 2,395                  3.40                            19.1  
MT          46,032            9,179                 4,390                  3.39                            25.9  
PA          92,453          21,036                 8,297                  3.15                            27.7  
PB          74,871          19,199                 7,418                  2.81                            31.6  
PE        113,927          38,574               23,155                  1.85                            36.5  
PI          52,930          15,690                 6,023                  2.44                            17.2  
PR        104,894          61,719               13,381                  1.40                            36.2  
RJ        215,772        110,008              84,972                  1.11                            42.1  
RN          73,742          13,166                 6,351                  3.78                            30.4  
RS        165,770        112,765              57,532                  0.97                            50.0  
SC          53,119          30,929                 8,042                  1.36                            28.3  
SE          35,266            8,741                 2,508                  3.14                            20.5  
SP        562,822        237,052             200,807                  1.29                            37.9  
TO          22,916            2,776                    395                  7.23                             8.6  
TOTAL     2,560,958     1,035,576             514,173                  1.65                            35.5  
Source: Secretarias Estaduais de Administração  2000 (data published by 
DEPEM/SPS/MPAS) 
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Graph 1  Actuarial Projection of the Federal Civil Employee Pension System 
 








































































Contribution Current Actives Deficit
Source: Probus (2001) 
 
Table 5 shows the current financial situation of State public-employee pension systems8. 
With the exception of two recently created States, all other systems are running a deficit. In 
a great number of States, particularly the ones with significant industrial production (SP, 
RJ, MG, RS), Government spending on benefit payments (the current deficit) already 
represents over 20% of the States Current Net Revenue (RCL)9. Though thorough actuarial 
                                                 
8 The Social Security Ministry is still colleting data that will allow a diagnosis of municipal public-employee 
pension systems. 
9 This concept refers to the sum of all revenue sources of a State or a municipality less some specified items: 
constitutional transfers (in the case of States) and pension system contributions collected from public 
employees. 
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projections of these pension systems are not available, in the few States where such 
analyses have been undertaken, they show a rapidly worsening situation that may lead, if 
correction measures are not introduced, to a greatly reduced capability of these States to 
keep up with necessary investments in education, health care, and security. It should be 
born in mind that the insufficiency of these investments will affect most adversely the low-
income population. As mentioned before, these pension systems were created without 
concern for their actuarial and financial equilibrium, a flaw that explains the relatively low 














































































Contributions Current Actives Deficit
Source: Governo Federal do Brasil (2001). 
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Table 5 - Financial Situation of State Public Employees Pension Systems (1998) 
 1998 2000 




Net Result as 
a % of State 
GDP 
Net Result as 
a % of State 
RCL 





as a % of 
State GDP 
Net Result as 
a % of State 
RCL 
AC -3 0.21 0.54 -11 NA 1.58
AL (1) -142 2.31 14.92 -143 NA 12.20
AM -144 0.95 10.08 -117 NA 6.07
AP 15 1.00 3.15 19 NA 3.41
BA -330 0.85 7.99 -520 NA 10.94
CE (1) -152 0.81 6.73 -191 NA 6.48
DF -705 2.81 17.23 -812 NA 15.20
ES -163 0.94 8.87 -297 NA 11.74
GO -412 2.37 22.35 -487 NA 19.70
MA (1) -124 1.72 9.62 -282 NA 14.55
MG -1.692 1.89 23.18 -2593 NA 28.25
MS (1) -71 0.71 10.06 -102 NA 8.97
MT (1) -141 1.42 11.05 -162 NA 9.26
PA -218 1.40 10.86 -330 NA 13.78
PB -183 2.52 14.87 -220 NA 13.76
PE -418 1.69 16.66 -594 NA 18.41
PI -68 1.54 8.01 -57 NA 5.16
PR -841 1.48 21.18 -989 NA 19.18
RJ -1.551 1.54 22.38 -2528 NA 27.89
RN (1) -78 1.14 6.84 -192 NA 11.83
RO 5 0.11 0.73 -5 NA 0.56
RR -1 0.13 0.25 14 NA 2.77
RS (1) -1.482 2.10 27.64 -2245 NA 35.83
SC -392 1.21 18.23 -374 NA 12.99
SE (1) -45 0.89 5.10 -99 NA 7.68
SP -4.494 1.39 17.93 -6816 NA 22.21
TO -1 0.05 0.13 -1 NA 0.14
Source: Demonstrativos Estados / Dados Publicados pelos Estados / STN / SPS-MPAS 
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GOVERNMENT 11% _ _ 
AC 8% up to R$177 10% above R$177 
4% up to R$177 
5% above R$177 
4% up to R$177 
5% above R$177 
AL 11% for survivor pension - - 
AM 14% - - 
AP 8% 8% 8% 
BA 6,5% 6,5% 6,5% 
CE 11% - - 
DF 11% - - 
ES 10% 10% - 
GO 6% - - 
MA 
Up to R$200, 8%  for pension and. 1%  for health 
Up to R$ 800, 9% for pension.and 1% for health 
Up to R$2000, 9% for pension and 2% for health 
Above R$2000, 10%  for pension and 2% for health 
- - 
MG 3,5% for retirement pension 4,2% for survivor pension - - 
MS 4% - - 
MT 8% up to R$260 12%  above R$260 - - 
PA 8%  for survivor pension - - 
PB 8% for survivor pension and health - - 
PE 13,5% for retirement and survivor pension   
PI 
8% up to R$280 
10% from R$280 up to R$1200 




10% up to R$1200 
14% on the amount above  R$1200 
 
10% up to R$1200 
14% on the amount above  
R$1200 
10% up to R$1200 
14% on the amount above  
R$1200 
RJ 11% -  
RN 8% - - 
RO 8% - - 
RR -  - - 
RS 
1,82% for retirement pension 
5,4% for survivor pension 
7,22% for health 
1,82% for retirement 
pension 
5,4% for survivor pension 
7,22% for health 
- 
SC 
8% up to 1 x MW (minimum wage)  
9% - from 1 to 4 x MW. 
10% - from 4 to 8 x MW 
11% - from 8 to 14 x MW 
12% above 14 x MW 
Only for survivors pensions 
8% up to 1 x MW  
9% - from 1 to 4 x MW. 
10% - from 4 to 8 x MW 
11% - from 8 to 14 x MW 
12% above 14 x MW 
Only for survivors pensions 
 
SE 
10% for retirement and survivor pension 
3% for Pension Fund 
10% 
(social assistance) 
0% up to 1 minimum wage 
10% above 1 MW  
(social assistance) 
SP 6% for survivor pension 6% for survivor pension - 
TO 9% 9% 9% 
Source: CGOAI/DEPSP/SPS 
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The 1998 Pension Reform  Constitutional Amendment Nº 20 
 
After being discussed in Congress for more than five years, pension reform legislation was 
finally sanctioned at the end of 1998 in the form of Constitutional Amendment nº 20. This 
amendment affected both the RGPS system and the public-employee pension system. The 
paper will deal only with measures related to the public-employee system. 
 
Probably the most important change was the introduction of stricter criteria for retirement 
in the public sector. To request voluntary retirement the public employee must prove at 
least 10 years of service in the public entity (Federal, State, or municipal) in whose system 
he will retire and 5 in years in the job from which he will retire. He must also fulfill these 
conditions: 60 years of age and 35 years of contribution for men; and 55 years of age and 
30 years of contribution for women10. The years of contribution may also include years in 
which the person contributed to the general system (RGPS). The important changes here 
are the minimum requirements of at least 10 years in public service and 5 years in the job 
from which retirement will occur. Before these changes, a civil servant with just two to 
three years of public service could be promoted to the a higher-paid job a few months 
before retirement and earn a retirement benefit equivalent to the last salary paid at this new 
job. The new amendment also stipulated that public-employee pension systems could only 
cover those who occupied permanent posts in the public sector and whose access was 
gained through a public examination. Previously those who occupied temporary public-
sector jobs or so-called commissioned jobs (from which they could be fired ad nutum by 
the public official responsible for the nomination) were also covered by a public-sector 
pension plan. According to Constitutional Amendment nº 20, these employees now must be 
enrolled in the INSS. 
 
The reform, however, failed to abolish two important privileges. First, the retirement 
benefit of the civil servant that fulfills the above-mentioned conditions will be equal to the 
                                                 
10 In the case where he or she does not fulfill the requirement of 35 and 30 years of contribution, respectively, 
the civil servant also has the option of retiring at the age of 65 (men) or 60 (women), with benefits 
proportional to their time of contribution.  
 16
last salary in the job at which he retired. Second, all salary increases granted to active 
personnel must necessarily be applied to retirement benefits and pensions paid.  
 
Survivor benefits also present a problem. The Constitution guarantees that the survivor will 
receive a benefit equivalent to 100% of the retiree benefit. In the event that the retiree was 
divorced and left two survivors with a right to a benefit (dividing among them the full 
retiree benefit), when one of the survivors dies, the other will start receiving the full benefit. 
Survivor benefits may never be less than 100% of the retirement benefit. 
 
The reform also established that the retirement benefit might not exceed the civil servants 
last salary in the job from which he retired. Previously, some employees received a type of 
special bonus upon retirement, which made their social-security benefits higher than the 
last salary. 
 
The provisions related to public-employee pensions of Constitutional Amendment nº 20 are 
treated in detail in Law 9.717 (General Law of Public Sector Pensions), also of 1998. A 
basic principle of this law is that public-employee pension systems at all government levels 
must be organized to guarantee their financial and actuarial equilibrium. The Federal, State, 
and municipal governments must therefore provide the Social Security Ministry with data 
proving that their public-employee pension system is either in or able to reach such an 
equilibrium. This law imposed two important limits on government spending on public-
sector pension plans: (a) the governments (Federal, State, or municipal) pension-plan 
contribution may not be more than twice that of the employee, and (b) net government 
expenditures on public-sector pension-plan benefits (total benefits minus employee 
contributions) may not exceed 12% of the governments Current Net Revenue (RCL). 
Looking at Graph 3, one can see that 13 Brazilian States are above this limit11. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Given the virtual impossibility of many States reaching this target by the established deadline (December 
31, 2001), it is expected that either this deadline will be postponed or a gradual reduction-schedule proposed. 
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Source: Demonstrativo Estados / Data published by the States / STN / organized by 
SPS/MPAS 
 
One item that must be highlighted in Law 9.717 is the demand for accounting and 
managerial information from public-sector pension plans. Every 2 months, each 
government must send to the Social Security Ministry the budget and accounting balances 
of the pension plan, indicating revenues and expenses for the 2-month period as well as for 
the last 12 months. Data must also be provided on the following items: (a) contributions of 
government bodies, (b) contributions of current active employees (civil and military), (c) 
contributions of retirees and survivors with pensions12, (d) total expenditures on civil and 
military personnel, (e) total expenditures on retirees and survivors with pensions, and (f) 
the Net Current Revenue (RCL). This measure was reinforced by Law nº 101 of May 2000 
                                                 
12 Although the Brazilian Supreme Court suspended contributions from these individuals, some states and 
municipalities whose legislation prior to 1998 established these contributions continue to charge them. 
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(the Fiscal Responsibility Law), which requires governments at all levels to prepare a Fiscal 
Target Annex in which an evaluation of the financial and actuarial projection of the public-
employee pension system must be present. These new requirements are fundamental: in the 
previous situation, most States and municipalities (and even the Federal Government) had 
little information regarding the functioning of their public-pension systems, much less the 
actuarial projections of these systems. Such data are vital for any long-term reform 
proposal. 
 
The question now is whether public administrators will comply with the aforementioned 
legislation13. The Federal Government will impose penalties on States and municipalities 
that fail to comply with the principles set forth in Law 9.717. From November 1, 2001 on, a 
certificate issued by the Social Security Ministry proving that the State or municipal 
pension system complies with certain principles will be demanded in the following 
operations, among others: (a) voluntary transfer from the Federal Government, and (b) 
loans and financing from federally owned financial institutions. Moreover, Complementary 
Law nº 101 (the Fiscal Responsibility Law)  a landmark in Brazilian public-administration 
legislation  specifies a ceiling on personnel expenses at every government level. Public 
administrators (Governors and mayors) who do not abide by the standards set may suffer 
civil and criminal prosecution. Since government expenses with retiree and survivor-benefit 
payments are computed in the personnel-expense limits (table 4 shows the ratio in the 
States), the management of public-employee pension systems has become an issue of great 
concern. It is still to be seen how effective this legislation will prove in pressing States and 
municipalities to reform their employee pension plans. It is also hoped that these laws will 
increase political pressure on Congressmen to approve the necessary public-sector pension 
reforms. 
 
Another important change introduced by the 1998 reform was the possibility of Federal, 
State, and municipal governments establishing complementary pension plans for their 
public employees. If such a plan is created, the basic pension plan can set a benefit limit 
                                                 
13 Brazil is a country with many good laws either weakly enforced or non-enforced. 
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equal to that of the general system (RGPS). This, however, will only be valid for public 
servants hired after the creation of this complementary plan or for those already in service 
to opt for the new system. At the time this paper was prepared, the Brazilian Congress was 
still considering the legislation that would effectively allow the establishment of these 
complementary plans.  
 
These public-sector complementary pension plans will operate just like private-sector 
pension funds, which have existed in Brazil for nearly three decades (Rabelo, 2000b) and 
must be fully funded. The project, as sent from the Social Security Ministry to Congress, 
stipulates that these complementary plans can only be defined-contribution. This is a matter 
of controversy in Congress since opposition parties with strong public employee base are 
arguing that each government unit must have the option of creating a supplementary 
defined-benefit plan. In terms of efficiency, it is senseless for the same unit (State or 
municipal) to sponsor two defined-benefit plans (one pay-as-you-go or partially funded and 
the other fully funded). Although the short-term effects of this project are insignificant, it 
opens the way for a long-term reform of public-employee pension systems. In effect, it will 
end with the obligation of granting a 100% replacement rate for those who receive above 
the RGPS ceiling (currently R$1,430).  
 
As part of the effort to stimulate the reform of public-sector pension plans, the new 
legislation (Constitutional Amendment nº 20 and Law 9.717) allows Federal, State, and 
municipal governments to create special funds to finance these pension plans. The idea here 
is to encourage within these systems some degree of pre-funding; this may be achieved by 
using available assets: funds from the privatization of State-owned companies, real estate, 
etc. This immediately raises an important question: Should the public sector be allowed to 
act as an investor (Rabelo, 2000a; Munnel and Sunden, 1999)? It must be noted that the 
creation of these funds is not obligatory and that their creation does not imply that public-
sector pension systems must move towards operating in a funded basis. As will be seen in 
section four, three States have already created such reserve funds (as a World Bank 
report has called them), but only one of them has a plan to move to a funded system. 
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In order to diminish the risk of direct political capture of the reserve funds, Law 9.717 set 
some important provisions: (a) the obligation to maintain a record of contributions to the 
plan (employer and employee contributions), (b) a requirement to separate the fund from 
Treasury operations, (c) a ban on lending to the sponsoring government or to plan 
participants, (d) a ban on investment in State and municipal securities, and (e) an 
investment regime determined by the National Monetary Council (CMN)14.  
 
In 1999, the CMN issued Resolution nº 2.652, regulating the investments of these funds. 
This resolution forbids in-house asset management and determines that this task must be 
hired out to public or private financial institutions. There are specific rules according to the 
source of the funds: (a) the sale of assets that have been transferred to the fund (real estate, 
shares of State-owned companies, etc.), and (b) employee and employer contributions, 
investment returns, and any cash transfer. Assets from source class (a) must be invested 
according to the following rules: 
(i) At least 80%, isolated or cumulatively, in National Treasury bills, Central Bank 
bills, bills or securities issued by financial institutions totally owned by the Federal 
Government, or bills and securities issued by subsidiaries of the aforementioned 
financial institutions. These bills must be non-negotiable and have a minimum 
duration of 15 years. 
(ii) The rest may be invested according to the same rules applying to assets from source 
(b). 
Rules governing the investment of source (b) assets are as follows:  
(i) Up to 100% may be invested in National Treasury or Central Bank bills. 
(ii) Up to 80% may be invested in the following fixed income vehicles: (a) savings 
accounts (no more than 5% in the same financial institution), and (b) investment 
funds. 
(iii) Up to 30% may be invested in equity funds approved by the Securities & 
Exchange Commission (CVM). 
 
                                                 
14 The highest-level organism in the Brazilian financial system, integrated, among other, by the Minister of 
Finance and the President of the Central Bank of Brazil. 
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There are also restrictions on the use of investment funds. A State or municipal public- 
employee pension fund may not own more than 20% of the total assets of any investment 
fund, and such pension funds together may not own more than 50% of any investment fund. 
This means that public-employee reserve funds must use retail investment funds for their 
investment in fixed-income or equity instruments, which bear a higher expense ratio than 
the exclusive funds organized by financial institutions for their larger clients. These 
restrictions related to the use of investment funds result in higher administration costs for 
the reserve funds without guaranteeing the risk protection desired by the legislator. In fact, 
there is no legal restriction on the investment of all source (b) assets in highly leveraged 
and aggressive retail funds. Also, the regulation of the selection process of asset managers 
is a point that has been left unclear. The law mentions only minimum criteria for this 
selection: financial solidity, volume of assets under management, and experience in the 
asset-management business.  
 
Law 9.717 already forbade public-employee pension-system funds to concede any type of 
loan, including loans to participants and sponsoring governmental units. It also vetoed 
investments in securities issued by State and municipal governments. These measures are 
quite adequate. 
 
An alternative to the regulation of source (b) asset investments would be to apply the same 
rules governing private pension funds; however with some exceptions: (a) direct real estate 
investments, and (b) non-listed securities. In the future, private-equity investments may be 
allowed through the use of a specialized fund15. The prohibition of in-house asset 
management should be kept. It is worth noting that the latest regulation of private pension 
fund investments requires that these funds maintain a risk evaluation and control tool, 




                                                 
15 Direct private-equity investments should not be allowed. 
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The Reform of The Federal Employee Retirement System in the U.S. 
 
Since December 1983, all new Federal public employees in the United States were 
automatically enrolled in the universal social-security program. The major objective of this 
measure was to improve the short-term financial conditions of the social-security system. 
Employees hired prior to this date were given the choice of remaining in the system or of 
moving to the new one; in fact only 2.8% of these employees opted for the transfer. De 
Jong and Turner (1998), who consider the old defined-benefit system more generous to 
those who intend to remain in Federal public service until retirement, argue that the 
reformed system given its greater portability is more interesting for those who intend to 
move to the private sector. Since migration was very low, the U.S. Federal Government 
currently maintains two pension system for its employees; in 1998, each system covered 
approximately 2.8 million active workers (FRTIB, 1998). 
 
The idea behind the 1983 reform of the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) was 
to create a system that would provide Federal public-employee retirement benefits similar 
to those offered to employees of large private-sector firms. The reformed FERS is 
composed of three pillars: (a) coverage by the public social-security system, (b) a 
supplementary defined-benefit plan  the Basic Benefit Plan, and (c) a supplementary and 
voluntary defined-contribution plan  the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). Federal employees 
must therefore contribute to the social-security system at the normal rate and also make an 
additional contribution of 0.8% of their salary to the Basic Benefit Plan. 
 
The Basic Benefit Plan pays a benefit based on the average of the highest annual salaries in 
three consecutive years. The benefit is calculated as 1% of these average earnings 
multiplied by years of service, so that an employee with 30 years service in the Federal 
public sector will receive a retirement benefit equivalent to 30% of the earnings average. 
The minimum retirement age depends on the date the employee was born. For those born 
before 1948, the required age is 55 years if they have 30 years of service. For those born 
from 1970 onwards, the required age is 57 years. If the employee does not fulfill the 30 
years of service requirement, he can retire at 60 years of age with 20 years of service or at 
 23
62 years with 5 years of service. If the employee opts to retire at 62 with more than 20 
years of service, the multiplying factor is increased to 1.1. The benefit is indexed to 
inflation only after the employee reaches the age of 62. The indexation mechanism offers 
full protection against inflation up to an annul rate of 2%; for rates of 3% or higher, 
indexation is calculated as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) minus 1%. This defined-benefit 
plan operates under full or quasi-full funding conditions (depending on the actuarial 
hypothesis utilized). Assets are almost entirely invested in U.S. Treasury bonds. 
 
The TSP is quite similar to the most popular defined-contribution plans in the U.S.  the 
401(k) plans. Employee contributions are tax deductible and the Federal Government also 
makes a matching contribution according to the employees contribution rate. The 
employee can effectively decide how much to contribute, how to invest his assets, and how 
to receive benefits. The Federal Government makes a minimum 1% contribution to all 
FERS-member employees. Employee contributions are voluntary and may reach up to 10% 
of their salary. Government matching contributions may be as much as 5% of employee 
salary according to the following scale: up to the first 3% of employee contribution, the 
Government matches on 1:1 basis; after that the matching contribution is half of that of the 
employee. The employee TSP account may thus receive contributions up to 15% of 
employee salary.  
 
The employee may distribute the balance of his account in three investment options. The G 
fund invests in short-term Treasury bills issued specially for this fund. The F fund is an 
indexed fixed-income fund that aims to replicate the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Index 
(LBA). This is an index formed of high-rate fixed-income securities, representing 
Government and private securities and mortgage-backed securities. Finally, there is the C 
fund  an indexed equity fund based on Standard & Poors index.  
 
The investments of the G Fund receive a statutory interest rate, which must legally be 
equivalent to the average return of Treasury bonds negotiated in the market and with a 
maturity of at least four years. Since all assets are invested into Government securities, the 
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB)  the independent Federal agency 
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responsible for managing the TSP, manages the fund in-house. The legislation that 
reformed the FERS determined that the C Fund be invested in an indexed equity fund. The 
FRTIB chose the S&P 500 as the most appropriate index to guide this fund. Likewise, the 
C Fund must invest in fixed-income securities. The option of FRTIB was to constitute it as 
an indexed bond fund following the LBA. External-asset managers chosen through a public 
competition must undertake management of Funds C and F. One of the most important 
features of TSP is its low management cost. Table 7 shows the expense ratio of each of the 
funds16.  
 
Table 7  Expense Ratios of TSP Funds (1988  1997) 
 Fund G Fund C Fund F 
1988 0.34% 0.29% 0.30% 
1989 0.21% 0.20% 0.23% 
1990 0.11% 0.13% 0.13% 
1991 0.13% 0.15% 0.16% 
1992 0.13% 0.14% 0.15% 
1993 0.12% 0.13% 0.14% 
1994 0.10% 0.11% 0.12% 
1995 0.09% 0.10% 0.11% 
1996 0.08% 0.09% 0.10% 
1997 0.07% 0.07% 0.08% 
Source: Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (1998: 32). 
 
Benefits granted by TSP may be paid in three forms: (a) the acquisition of an annuity. (b) a 
single lump sum payment, or (c) a programmed monthly withdrawal. If the participant 
chooses form (a), TSP will purchase from an insurance company an annuity on behalf of 
the participant. For this purpose TSP maintains a contract with an annuity provider.  
 
                                                 
16 These rates are calculated dividing total annual expenses by the average account balance used in the 
allocation of the returns of each fund. 
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Table 8 shows that evolution of TSPs assets, which make it one of the largest funded 
pension plans in the U.S. Fund C is by far the largest of the three and the one that earned 
the highest returns in the 10-year period completed in 1999. It is also the fund, which 
receives the largest amount of contributions (table 9) 
 
 
Table 8  Assets of TSP 






2000 (end August) 103 
Source: Pensions & Investments (02/10/2000: 69). 
 
Table 9  Asset Value and 10 Year Annualized Rate of Return (completed in 1999) of the 
Three TSP Funds 
 Total Assets 
(August/99) 
Contributions 
Received in 1999 
Annualized 10-year 
Return Rate 
Fund G - US$335 millions - 
Fund C US$66,3 billions US$4.1 billions 18.2% 
Fund F - US$1.6 billions 7.5% 







First Reform Experiences in Brazilian States17 
 
Four States  Bahia, Paraná, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro  have already approved 
legislation reforming their public-employee the pension system. A common feature of these 
four reform experiences was an increase in employee contributions to the pension system. 
Another point in common was the clear separation of the pension system from health care 
and social assistance. These States have also created special funds  whose accounts are 
segregated from the State Treasury  to finance the pension system, as required by Law 
9.717. 
 
There are however some important differences in these processes. In the case of Paraná and 
Pernambuco18 the idea was to divide public employees into two groups and create separate 
funds to finance the pensions of each group. The first group  retirees, survivors with 
pensions, and employees with less than five years time to retirement  would still have their 
pensions financed in a pay-as-you-go basis, but with some degree of pre-funding through 
the transfer of State Government assets to a financial fund. The second group  
employees with five years or more to retirement  will have their pensions guaranteed by a 
funded system, which will receive employee and State Government contributions. Within 
this framework there would be an effective transition in 40 to 50 years from a pay-as-you-
go system to a fully funded pension system.  
 
The major caveat in the process is the cost of this transition. The State would have to keep 
paying the benefits of current retirees and survivors and add an extra expenditure in order 
to capitalize the newly created funded system (group two of employees). In the case of 
Paraná these costs are easier to bear given the royalties from the Itaipú hydroelectric plant 
and the proceeds from the privatization of the States electrical-utility firm (planned to 
happen in 2001). The government of Paraná negotiated with the Federal Government a 15- 
year anticipation of the royalties owned to the Itaipú plant and allocated the Government 
                                                 
17 This section is based on a report prepared by the author for the Brazilian Social Security Ministry on the 
reform of public-employee pension plans in four States (Rabelo, 2001). 
18 Pernambuco has still not implemented the funds mentioned in State Law nº 28 of 14th January 2000. 
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bonds received in the public-employee pension system. Pernambuco, however, does not 
have any important assets to be transferred to the reformed pension system, which is 
certainly the reason why the reform has not yet been implemented (the law was approved in 
14th January, 2000). It should be mentioned that the actuarial cost plan in Paraná was 
devised supposing that contributions could be collected from retirees and survivors with 
pensions. The Federal Supreme Court's suspension of these contributions has jeopardized 
these calculations. 
 
The author and his team at Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo are aiding a small State 
in the reform of its public-employee pension system. As this State also lacks relevant assets 
to smooth transition costs, we have thus devised a longer transition period: the new system, 
which will operate on a funded basis, will only cover employees hired after the reform law 
is approved. If employee contribution rates are raised to the recommended levels and some 
relatively minor State assets are used to fund the reformed system, the State will probably 
enjoy even in the short run a savings in pension expenses. In this case the full transition 
should occur within a 70- to 80-year period. 
 
In Bahia and Rio de Janeiro a transition to a funded system was not designed; rather, the 
States introduced a degree of pre-funding through the creation of special funds to finance 
the State employee pension systems. The State of Bahia transferred full proceeds from the 
privatization of the States electricity utility firm  around R$ 400 million in 1998  to the 
public-employee pension system fund (FUNPREV). Later a deal anticipating the proceeds 
from the future privatization of the States water-supply company was closed with a 
Federal Government-owned financial institution (some cash and the greater part in Federal 
Government bonds). The State also allocated these assets to FUNPREV. Rio de Janeiro 
utilized the royalties from oil extraction along its coast to pre-fund the public-employee 
pension system. Moreover, a royalty anticipation deal with the Federal Government gave 
the State around R$7 billion in Government bonds, which it has transferred to the public-
employee pension fund (RIOPREVIDÊNCIA). However, the approach used by these two 
States is potentially risky, as these funds may simply be used to pay current pension 
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expenditures, alleviating the State budgets temporarily without producing a long-term 
solution to the imbalance of their public-employee pension systems.  
 
Another difference in these case studies refers to the management structure of the public-
employee pension system. Previously these four States, like the majority of Brazilian 
States, worked with the same bi-partite structure comprising an institute responsible for the 
management and payment of survivor pensions and a decentralized procedure for the 
management and payment of retirement benefits (each unit of the State administration 
managing its own retirees). These decentralized procedures imply that a public-employee 
must request retirement benefits directly to the human resources department of his place of 
employment. Its the staff of this department that will analyze his or her request. In case the 
employee is considered to fulfill the necessary conditions, he or she will be transferred to 
the retiree payroll of this public-service body. As a result of this widespread practice, 
practically no Brazilian State Government has unified information regarding the 
demographic characteristics of their retirees and the individual value of each benefit. These 
four States have been trying to organize a central database with all information related to 
retirees and survivors with pensions. This is not an easy task since some State organs  
particularly those belonging to the judicial system  have been unwilling to pass on 
information about their retirees. 
 
Paraná, however, has created an entity that will be responsible for the management, 
including asset management, of the entire State public-employee pension system; 
Pernambuco, for its part, plans to create a similar entity; and Rio de Janeiro and Bahia will 
delegate management to more than one State body. Paranás new entity 
(PARANAPREVIDÊNCIA), in its structure and functions, is quite similar to a U.S. public 
pension fund. Rio de Janeiros project plans to centralize in the entity formerly responsible 
for survivor pensions (IPERJ) the following functions: (a) the organization and 
actualization of a central retiree-and-survivor database, and (b) the analysis and concession 
of retirement and survivor benefits. The newly created body (RIOPREVIDÊNCIA) will be 
responsible for the management of the public-employee pension systems assets, for the 
collection of contributions, and for the payment of benefits granted by IPERJ. In Bahia, the 
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Government abolished the Institute for Survivor Pensions and intends to centralize all 
information regarding retirees and survivors in the State Administration Department 
(Secretaria Estadual de Administração). The assets of the State public-employee pension 
system are managed by FUNPREV, a section of the State Finance Department (Secretaria 
Estadual de Administração). The path followed by Paraná and Pernambuco in this area is 
considered wiser, since there is efficiency gains in having a single entity manage the entire 
public pension system. Here one might also raise the question regarding the optimal 
governance structure for these public-sector pension funds. In many developing countries 
these funds may hold a significant amount of much needed long-term savings and their 




Although important steps towards a comprehensive reform of public-sector pension 
systems have been taken, it is unclear how systems that are still so generous to their 
participants and absorb such a large portion of government revenues can be maintained. A 
recent study just completed at the Getulio Vargas Foundation and based on the data of one 
Brazilian State, concluded that in order to offer a fully funded plan to public employees 
hired after 2001, a total contribution rate of 47.1% of wages would have to be divided 
between active employees and the State Government. If the limit set by Law 9.717 were 
obeyed, it would leave employees with a contribution rate of 15.7% and the government 
with one of 31.4%. A retirement benefit and a survivor pension equal to the employees last 
salary, along with the automatic transfer of salary increases to pension benefits, are two 
Constitutional guarantees that deserve careful consideration by Brazilian society. Another 
important consideration is how to introduce actuarial fairness into this pension system, 
given that current contribution rates in many States and municipalities, together with other 
retirement requirements, lead these systems to operate in permanent deficit. The huge 
political problem is how to raise contributions and/or reduce pension benefits for one of the 
most well organized groups in society, a group that in many cases is facing a prolonged 
salary freeze.  
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In line with these arguments, a recent World Bank report rightly points out that the 
introduction of pre-funding to public-employee pension systems would be an effective 
measure only if these systems are put into operational balance. The report therefore calls 
for a parametrical reform of these systems, the most viable option being a reduction of 
benefit entitlements (World Bank 2000: 141). If such measures are not taken, the assets 
already allocated to the reserve funds of the States of Bahia, Pernambuco, Paraná, and Rio 
de Janeiro run the risk of being spent without providing a long-term solution to the 
problems of the respective State public-sector pension systems. Thus, assets that could be 
put to much better use would be spent to secure the payments of an unbalanced pension 
system. In light of this, it is obvious that a far-reaching and profound reform of public-
sector pension plans is essential. 
 
The point in the World Bank report that deserves deeper discussion is the recommendation 
that sponsor risk be diversified through the integration of the basic component19 (the 
defined-benefit plan) of public-employees pension systems within RGPS. This measure 
would provide participants with the benefits of the broader coverage of RGPS and thus lead 
to an improved pooling of intergenerational risk. However, though such a measure would 
be the best solution for reforming public-sector pension systems, it would demand a change 
in the Constitution and the approval of Law Project nº 9. The basic principle is to build a 
pension plan  similar to the U.S. Governments reformed Federal Employee Retirement 
System  for Brazilian Federal, State, and municipal employees, a plan that would emulate 
the retirement benefit packages of large private-sector employers. The RGPS would be the 
basic pillar for all. Moreover, voluntary, funded, defined-contribution plans (whose 
matching formula would depend both on the financial conditions of each State or 
municipality and on a negotiation process) would complement the system. 
 
It is, however, financially and politically unfeasible for the States and municipalities to 
transfer all their statutory employees to the INSS. Here again the FERS reform lesson 
applies: after the approval of the necessary Constitutional Amendment and the State or 
                                                 
19 This is to make a distinction between the existing DB systems and the complementary funded pension plan 
that will be created if the Brazilian Congress approves Law Project nº 9. 
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municipal pension-reform laws, only newly hired public employees would be automatically 
enrolled in the RGPS, with the employing government body paying the normal employer 
contribution (20% of payroll). Parametrical changes would be introduced to the old pension 
system: (a) retirees and pensioners would be required to pay contributions, and (b) current 
active-worker benefits would be reduced according to an actuarially fair rule. Retiree and 
survivor benefits would no longer be legally equal to the last salary, and automatic transfers 
of salary increases given to active retiree and survivor pensions would cease. Ideally, the 
system would grant an employee a retirement or survivor pension that would replace 
around 65% of the average of his last three to five years of active duty. Naturally, a 
transition formula would have to be worked out would in order to respect the rights of those 
near retirement. 
 
In case integration with RGPS proves to be politically unfeasible, the alternative seems to 
be the financing of a transition period to a funded public-sector pension system. This would 
also require a parametric reform of public-sector pension systems according to the 
principles already discussed. The States and municipalities would offer a basic defined-
benefit plan supplemented by a voluntary defined-contribution plan, both fully funded20. 
Here again a gradual transition process, designed according to the funding capacity of each 
State or municipality, could be applied. The most gradual design would enroll in the 
reformed funded pension plan only public employees hired after the reform. Other public 
employees would remain in a closed pension plan that could be phased out within 60 to 
70 years. At first the transition costs would be low, but pressure will grow in around 20 
years for a 10-year period, which might give time for public administrators to devise an 
adequate financing mechanism. In any event, if the proposed parametric reforms are 
introduced, these transition costs will probably remain below government expenses if the 
system is kept unaltered. A rigorous analysis of the costs of and alternatives for such a 
                                                 
20 It is doubtful that the Federal Government will opt to fund the basic defined-benefit pillar of its reformed 
public-employee pension system. 
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transition process will only be viable when the actuarial databases and actuarial evaluations 
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